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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


**The Long War Concept: Using the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force
to Address Irregular Threats through Shaping and Deterrence**

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for
the Degree of Master of Military Studies

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
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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Long War Concept: Using Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Forces to Address Irregular Threats through Shaping and Deterrence

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Thesis: Security cooperation is a valid and relevant concept, and the security cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) gives the Marine Corps the capability to address the challenge of building and sustaining partner security capacity to assist in countering the challenge of the Long War.

Discussion: As the nation comes to grips with the momentous task of combating terrorism and other irregular threats in the Long War, it must continually assess the effectiveness of foreign policy, and especially the employment of military force. Security cooperation, aimed at building partner nation's security capacity, is quickly becoming an attractive alternative to direct military force for combating the causal factors of global instability, terrorism, irregular threats. Security cooperation efforts can enable the framework for providing an international response to these emerging global threats that the Long War will bring. The Marine Corps is currently poised to increase security cooperation and accept security cooperation as a deliberate mission. The Marine Corps creation of a new unit, the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) will be an effective means to project force and conduct security cooperation efforts. This paper will explain the nature of the Long War and how security cooperation can counter irregular threats by helping to reduce ungoverned spaces. It will explain how the Marine Corps is well suited to conduct security cooperation operations and how the employment of the SC MAGTF can be an effective means for conducting security cooperation.

Conclusion: Security cooperation is a valid concept to counter the irregular threats the nation now faces in the Long War. The Marine Corps needs to increase security cooperation efforts and embrace efforts to reduce causal factors of instability and terrorism. The adoption and employment of the SC MAGTF is the Marine Corps best opportunity to provide effective security cooperation.

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"We will deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory... We will diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk..."

-National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

III. Introduction

Influential military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz posits that the supreme act of judgment for the statesmen and commander is to understand the kind of war on which the nation is embarking. The nation is currently engaged in what has been called the Long War. This conflict will most likely span decades as America and its allies battle to defeat Islamic extremism and the ideology that fuels it. Nearly a decade since the attacks of 9/11, the nation as a whole is beginning to understand the character of this struggle and is reorienting and adapting to face the challenges. The emerging characteristic of The Long War is an increase in the number of irregular threats, particularly radical, or militant, Islamic terrorism aimed at destabilizing the current world order. Post 9/11 events serve to highlight the limitations of traditional military solutions to counter irregular threats and forced the nation to develop a better strategy for the application of military power. One solution in this transformation of strategy, outlined in the *2006 National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) and in the *2005 National Defense Strategy* (NDS), is to maximize global teamwork by bolstering the security efforts of allies and partners through security cooperation.ⁱ

Both of the previously mentioned documents provide guidance to each branch of the military to increase security cooperation efforts. To address this direction, the Marine Corps published a Long War concept in two seminal concept papers, *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment* and *Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept to Meet an Uncertain Security Environment*.ⁱⁱ These two Marine concept

papers forecast a renewed importance in security cooperation to counter irregular threats, and the creation of a new organization within the deployment cycle, the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF).

This paper will answer three questions. First: Is security cooperation a valid concept to face today's irregular challenges? Second: Should the Marine Corps adopt security cooperation as a Mission? And, third: Is the Marine Corps concept of the Security Cooperation Marine Air ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) an effective means to conduct security cooperation efforts? To answer these questions, this paper will first explain the irregular nature of the Long War and how security cooperation can counter irregular threats by helping to reduce ungoverned spaces. Then, the paper will highlight some recent examples of security cooperation successes. Finally, this paper will explain how the Marine Corps is suited to conduct security cooperation operations and how the employment of the SC MAGTF can be an effective means for conducting security cooperation. Ultimately, this paper intends to prove that Security Cooperation is a valid concept to counter irregular threats, that the Marine Corps should increase security cooperation efforts, and that the SC MAGTF gives the Marine Corps the capability to address the challenge of building partner security capacity to assist in countering the challenges of the Long War

IV. The Predominate Irregular Threat

The Long War will be an irregular war against enemies who cannot be defeated solely by conventional combat power. Along with the threat of Islamic terrorism, there is the ever-present potential for conventional conflict, humanitarian crisis, natural disaster, and the growing menace of weapons of mass destruction. When mixed together these threats create a volatile security environment that is both daunting and uncertain.ⁱⁱⁱ This uncertainty presents a dilemma for how

the Marines Corps should prepare to confront a growing irregular challenge while maintaining its competitive edge as the world's premier expeditionary warfighting force.

Irregular methods make sense for enemies of the United States. These enemies understand the value of asymmetric strategy when dealing with the overwhelming conventional combat power of the United States military.^{iv} Conventional applications of combat power can be counter productive against these irregular enemies who can often be difficult to locate and impossible to pattern. Marine forces must continue to adapt to these irregular enemies who will shrewdly evolve to capitalize on any weakness and avoid any strength.

The irregular threat is in many ways very different from the enemies the Marine Corps trained to fight in the pre-9/11 era. Pre-9/11 training focused on nation state enemies fighting with static uniformed armies. These enemies were predictable, homogenous, rigid, hierarchical, and slow to change. The current irregular threat is dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid, networked, and constantly and rapidly evolving. Today's real enemies include hostile or potentially hostile states, transnational terrorists, organized crime affiliates, drug traffickers, and insurgents embittered and motivated by long-standing religious, ethnic, or tribal conflicts.^v

The interdependence of terrorist and criminal organizations is well developed and not yet fully understood. For example, insurgency, terrorism, and drug trade often work together in a "symbiotic relationship", forming a network of illegal and destabilizing activity.^{vi} Principal among these irregular terrorist threats is militant Islam. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) identifies terrorism, specifically Islamic terrorism, as the principal irregular thereat facing the United States and "the enemy" in the Long War.^{vii}

Countering irregular enemies, especially terrorist networks, can be difficult using conventional applications of military force, such as relying solely on killing or capturing high

value terrorists. First, actual terrorists and international criminals have proven difficult to locate.^{viii} Terrorist networks can concentrate power where and when needed, and then rapidly disperse for survivability. A strategy of killing or capturing terrorists has proven only marginally effective in reducing the threat of terrorism around the world.^{ix} In many cases, military force can undermine the overall strategic objective. Direct military force can often have unforeseen repercussions as well. Foreign policy that relies too heavily on military force can make America appear to be a heavy handed oppressor and fail to address the causes and support of terrorist organizations. A strategy of kill or capture can also indirectly assist the improvement of terrorist organization, by eliminating less intelligent terrorists leaving the smart ones to adapt and evolve their tactics.

The limitations of effective deterrence by force and the realization of the environment in which terrorists operate has led the Marine Corps to develop a modified approach to prevention and shaping through security cooperation. These terrorists thrive in ungoverned and under-governed spaces of the world. Security cooperation can reduce ungoverned spaces and indirectly change the environment terrorists need to thrive. Countering irregular threats indirectly through security cooperation rather than relying mainly on a on a “kill and capture” strategy is a promising concept.^x

V. Is Security Cooperation a Valid Concept to Counter Irregular Threats?

Countering irregular threats is the central security task of the Long War.^{xi} In the preceding pages, this paper discussed the limitations of using conventional application of military power as a sole means to counter irregular threats and will now present security cooperation as a better alternative to counter irregular threats.

The Department of Defense definition for security cooperation is:

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.^{xii}

Security cooperation aims to assist America's partners and allies to contribute to global security and the fight against irregular threats operating in and around their countries. These threats are common in weak and failing states that are most threatened by terrorist and other transnational criminals and whose weakness directly threatens not only the United States' security, but also the openness and prosperity of all free societies.^{xiii}

Security cooperation, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defense, and training and advisory missions seem much more relevant today than Cold War-era high-intensity operations the Marine Corps prepared for and practiced prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. Security Cooperation aims to prevent some of the conditions that contribute to instability, such as lack of governance, uncontrolled borders, and ineffective military forces. Terrorist networks and the illegal activity that funds them thrive in areas where there is little or no effective government.

Countering irregular threats across the globe is an enormous endeavor. The United States does not have the manpower or the resources to conduct such operations alone.^{xiv} Concerned countries and international, regional, and sub-regional organizations need to assume responsibility for peace keeping and stabilization.^{xv} In a recent speech, President George W. Bush announced the time of "paternalism" in U.S. foreign policy is over. American foreign aid to troubled countries is an "investment and not a donation."^{xvi} The president's comments may reflect years of spending with little progress or security improvement in places like Africa. Security cooperation is a more direct way to assist countries in managing their own security

affairs and contributing to a shared security environment than administering uncoordinated aid and expecting lasting results.

Security cooperation also provides a useful framework to build a comprehensive and integrated strategy with allies. Security cooperation will enable these partner states to increase their capacity to defend their borders and territories and eliminate ungoverned spaces hospitable to terrorists and other transnational threats. It provides them the tools they need to assist the United States in the struggle of the Long War. Using security cooperation to build partner capacity, perform collective stabilization operations, and collective reconstruction efforts can enable America and its partners to resolve hotspots of instability around the world collectively. The result of a collective security based on cooperation and common goals would exceed any efforts the United States could make acting on its own.

Security Cooperation can develop common thinking with our allies and partners about security issues as well as build capability and willingness to take on missions that serve our common interests. The United States, with finite resources and limited access to sovereign states, can neither hope to nor desire to defeat these global threats without assistance and cooperation with partners and allies. The 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States (NDS) makes this point very clearly when it states, "International partnerships continue to be a principal source of our strength. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than we could achieve on our own."^{xvii} Given the need and potential for a better solution through a shared vision of security and cooperation among security nations, security cooperation makes sense to counter irregular threats. Thus, the Marine Corps should increase security cooperation efforts to enlist the assistance of partners and allies to defeat irregular threats.

The design of the Marine Long War Concept seeks to build a holistic force by adding security cooperation and building partner capacity to the Marine Corps' list of deliberate missions. This new emphasis on security cooperation is a paradigm change for the Marine Corps. The Long War concept makes security cooperation, designed to bolster weak and failing states, a deliberate task in normal operations of deployed forces and not necessarily secondary to combat operations. Deploying Marine forces to conduct security cooperation as a preventive action against irregular threats in pre-conflict situations can pay enormous dividends. For example, security cooperation uses shaping, which is designed to prevent conflict and could preclude the requirement for large scale U.S. intervention. Its design is to increase a partner's ability to prevent local frictions from developing into a full-blown crisis.

VI. Reducing Ungoverned Spaces through Security Cooperation

"Ungoverned spaces" are increasingly cited as a key threat to global security and American interests throughout the world. Often these spaces are seen as synonymous with failed states, or states that are unable to effectively exercise sovereignty. A primary goal of security cooperation is to improve governance in such areas, in order to deny sanctuary to terrorists, WMD proliferators, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminals because, as the 2002 National Security Strategy contends, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones."^{xviii} In a global environment, everything is interconnected, and ungoverned spaces, even in far off, remote areas of the globe, pose a risk to security and stability.^{xix} The United States government recognizes the importance of preventing and reducing "ungoverned areas that can become havens for terrorists."^{xx} Terrorists use these spaces, including weak and failed states, as sanctuaries for training, recruitment, and funding activities. It seems self-evident

that by implementing effective governance in many of these environments terrorist and insurgent activities can be disrupted or even prevented. Sanctuary denial and border interdiction are the typical means for disrupting the requirements necessary for insurgents to exist.^{xxi} Such operations, however, are impossible to accomplish without the assistance and cooperation of the host nation and collaboration with an effective host nation military.

By working with and through host nations, the United States can assist in the reduction of ungoverned spaces where irregular threats thrive. Denying extremists and terrorists control of these spaces would effectively “drain the swamp” of potential recruits and funding to terrorist organizations. Through security cooperation, the Marine Corps can help create reductions in ungoverned space by training professional military forces with adequate civilian control. Many countries in the world use their organic military forces in a constabulary role, in addition to national defense. Countries with identified border control problems, large ungoverned areas, and unstable governments would benefit from the U.S.’s properly equipped and well led military. Marine Corps security cooperation efforts would strive to enable countries to control their borders and maritime space and react responsibly when needed in regional crisis thereby strengthening regional responsibility as well as internal stability.

VII. Security Cooperation Success in Recent History

In auguring the validity of security cooperation to counter irregular threats, it might be helpful to examine some recent security cooperation actions. Coalition operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, humanitarian relief after natural disasters mission, assistance to the African Union and now the establishing of Africa Command are examples of successful security cooperation efforts making progress toward global stability. The following are a few recent, but

lesser known, security cooperation missions. These missions are generally small scale and would seem to fit the size and duration of Marine security cooperation efforts as interpreted by *Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept to Meet an Uncertain Security Environment.*”

U.S.-Malaysia. Often overlooked, the U.S.-Malaysian relationship is a near textbook example of effective security cooperation in a troubled part of the world. Historically, Malaysia has been a steady, reliable friend of the United States and has participated in a security cooperation partnership that has benefited both countries for decades. Malaysia occupies a strategic location along the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea and devotes considerable resources to maintaining safe and free shipping lanes. Malaysia is a moderate Islamic nation that shares common interests and values with the U.S. including a commitment to democracy, religious tolerance, and diversity. Malaysian forces regularly conduct joint training with United States counterparts, and the United States routinely enjoys access to Malaysian airfields and ports and jungle warfare training. As a result of effective security cooperation, Malaysia plays a key leadership role in Southeast Asia to promoting peace and stability by cooperating with regional partners. Malaysia is a regular contributor to United Nations’ missions including East Timor, Kosovo, and battling the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Furthermore, over 100 Malaysian soldiers participated in the battle of Mogadishu in support of U.S. forces.^{xxii}

U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (RP). The US has had an on-again, off-again bilateral military relationship with the RP for over 60 years. In January 2000, the RP and the United States resumed joint military training after a five-year hiatus. The Global War on Terrorism has brought the United States and the Republic of the RP closer together. Hundreds of U.S. troops have been conducting military-assistance operations in the Philippines since 2002, to combat

radical Islamic terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. These efforts are helping the government of the Philippines to control ungoverned difficult territory inside their borders. The U.S. role is to help train local Philippine soldiers in operations against insurgents. In addition, since 2002, the Philippines and the United States have carried out joint military exercises on southern Philippine islands. These exercises, in which U.S. troops provided non-combat assistance, have significantly reduced the strength of Abu Sayyaf and also resulted in the elimination of many of its senior leaders. The mission has also worked to improve the root cause of instability, such as encouraging improvements in governance. Although the Philippine islands are far from secure, security cooperation has helped the RP reestablish or regain control of much of its ungoverned space.

The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). In the beginning of 2001, the Republic of Georgia was a weak state that had trouble controlling regions within its borders.^{xxiii} These ungoverned spaces were known to harbor terrorist organizations. The GTEP was designed to professionalize the Georgian Army as part of the Global War on Terrorism. Beginning in 2002, the GTEP lasted approximately two years, with some military assistance continuing today. The program trained four light infantry battalions and one mechanized armor company. As a sign of good faith, the Republic of Georgia contributed two light infantry battalions to Multinational Forces in Iraq to help provide security there. In addition to coalition operations, GTEP has resulted in a stronger country with a more professional military force.

Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). CARAT is an annual exercise consisting of a series of Navy and Marine Corps bilateral training evolutions between the U.S. and several Southeast Asian countries, in which U.S. Marines and Sailors train cross-culturally with service members of Southeast Asian partners. Participants historically include

the navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The program is designed to build a shared understanding of cultures and teamwork between Southeast Asian countries and the United States. Starting in 1995, CARAT has increased interoperability and cooperation among the countries, and helped build lasting partnerships between the United States and nations involved.

VIII. Should the Marine Corps Adopt Security Cooperation as a Concept?

Security cooperation, consisting mainly of foreign internal defense and nation-building missions, is not new to the Marine Corps. Marines have a rich history with “Small Wars” prior World War II. For example, in the first half of the 20th century, Marines conducted counterinsurgency, nation-building, and peacekeeping in places like Nicaragua and Haiti. The Marine Corps was the first of the services to address this type of doctrine and tactics with the publication of the *Small Wars Manual*, which is still widely referenced today regarding irregular operations. Given this ancestry, the Marine Corps should be culturally well-suited to excel in this kind of irregular warfare in the 21st century.

Security cooperation will test Marine versatility and capabilities. Marines will be required to be both fighters and peace builders in ways only imagined when General Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, published “The Strategic Corporal and Three Block War.”^{xxiv}

However, there is good indicators that Marines will be able to make the Marine Corps has laid a good doctrinal foundation in expeditionary culture that will assist in the adoption of security cooperation. Other Marine Corps concepts, such as Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Distributed Operations, have laid the foundation for the adaptability and agility to conduct

security cooperation and are incorporated into the Marines Long War Concept. The Long War Concept does not change these concepts as much as it gives a direction for their employment. Marines operating disaggregated on land, sea, or as part of a MAGTF that is tailored to the needs of the mission are a good fit for security cooperation missions because these concepts are already ingrained in the Marine ethos and doctrine. Operating in the littorals with the capabilities of the MAGTF, Marines are equipped to handle the expeditionary nature of security cooperation missions.

After the Marine Corps' ground force commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan scale back, the Marine Corps will have a surplus of combat power. This surplus of forces can then be added to security cooperation efforts. The addition of 27,000 Marines to the Corps by 2012 will bring the end strength of the Marine Corps to 202,000 and will support a force structure of 27 Infantry Battalions. Operational tempo will consist of 18 of the battalions conducting full spectrum training, with 9 Infantry Battalions forward deployed. The resulting increase in forward deployed forces capable of conducting security cooperation missions will enable the Marine Corps to build capacity in partners and allies.

IX. The Design of the SC MAGTF

The task organization of the SC MAGTF is similar the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Figure 1 (see Appendix 1) explains the task organization of the SC MAGTF. The organization consists of a ground combat element (GCE), a logistics combat element (LCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and any additional capabilities or attachments needed for the security cooperation mission as required. Similar to a MEU, the SC MAGTF will have the infantry battalion at the core of its task organization and will be tailored for security cooperation.

The SC MAGTF will deploy to a forward operating site and send out detachments throughout a designated Area of Responsibility to conduct security cooperation missions. In a crisis, the SC MAGTF can re-aggregate and redeploy to meet contingencies. The SC MAGTF remains a general purpose force capable of full spectrum operations.

Furthermore, the SC MAGTF expands the Corps' capabilities into the lower end of the expeditionary force spectrum to increase and sustain forward presence, while retaining the ability to reorient for more traditional missions. Figure 2 (see Appendix 2) explains how the SC MAGTF expands the Marine Corps capabilities across the continuum of conflict. The SC MAGTF is not a replacement for the MEU. Rather, it is a separate entity and is capable of working separately in support of the combatant commander's security cooperation efforts. Additionally, the SC-MAGTF will be linked to the Navy's Global Fleet Stations to facilitate operations with amphibious shipping, high speed vessels, and other naval support to provide forward presence via seabasing.

Send in the Marines describes the SC MAGTF as "similar to a MEU but task organized for security cooperation and civil military operations[;] this SC MAGTF will have the capabilities, mobility, and sustainability commensurate with its requirements to provide training to less-developed military forces."^{xxv} That is, the security cooperation MAGTF will be built around an infantry battalion, but task organized with forces suited to provide security cooperation. This SC MAGTF will be augmented with enhanced medical, veterinary, dental, law-enforcement, and engineering capabilities and forces to assist in training host nation militaries and improving conditions of the populace.

This robust task organization of the SC MAGTF will enable it to provide more than military training. The SC MAGTF will have the organic resources to build the capabilities of

indigenous essential services in concert with an interagency effort. The SC MAGTF ultimately seeks to reduce grievances of the local population in order to allow mission success.^{xxvi}

Although it is preferable for the host nation to provide these services, SC MAGTF can provide them if the services do not exist and help build the host nation capacity to provide them through training.^{xxvii}

One key element in the SC MAGTF design is its general purpose nature. In the spirit of Every Marine a Rifleman, the SC MAGTF and its supporting units are considered a war fighting organization as much as any other MAGTF. The SC MAGTF will retain the ability to rapidly deploy to operate across the spectrum of conflict. SC MAGTF deployment training will consist of traditional combined arms training with the same standards as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or other deploying MAGTF, but with additional culture and mission focused training for the specific security cooperation mission.^{xxviii} This general-purpose nature ensures the SC MAGTF remains a viable war fighting unit, able to quickly transition to conventional operations in a contingency or if security cooperation efforts fail.^{xxix}

Finally, the Marine Long War Concept establishes regionally focused infantry regiments and supporting units. Figure 2 (see Appendix 2) shows a proposed deployment rotation for Marine units that achieve a regional focus and recurring expeditionary missions. The same unit will deploy roughly to the same area and conduct the same missions repeatedly. These units will develop increased proficiency in security cooperation operations and cultural awareness from habitual unit deployments. In addition, any Marine with regional specialties or specific experience can be assigned to these regiments to support the habitual operations. This regional focus adds a degree of specialty to the units conducting security cooperation missions without compromising the general-purpose nature previously discussed.

X. SC MAGTF Capabilities, Obstacles, and Recommendations

Now that the SC MAGTF has been explained, it is time to examine if the SC MAGTF will be an effective means for the Marine Corps to conduct security cooperation. First, some of the capabilities the SC MAGTF provides will be discussed, and then some obstacles and recommendations will be provided.

Addition of the SC MAGTF Provides Full Spectrum Capability to the Marine Corps. By constructing a MAGTF designed for security cooperation, the Marine Corps will support Combatant Commander's security cooperation efforts. The SC MAGTF will help build partner capacity and shape the environment throughout the military operational spectrum. Figure 3 (see Appendix 3) explains the continuum of military operations. "Phase 0" and "Phase 5" typically involve activities consistent with the lower end of the military operational spectrum. The addition of the SC MAGTF expands the Marine Corps' expeditionary capabilities to the lower end of the spectrum to increase and sustain forward presence, while retaining ability to re-aggregate and reorient for more traditional missions. SC MAGTF operations in the lower spectrum include counter-insurgency, foreign internal defense, and training and advisory missions.

Security cooperation missions are of paramount importance in today's irregular threat environment, maybe even more so than during Cold War-era high-intensity operations. However, security cooperation missions have not been primary missions for the Marine Corps in the past. They were often not deliberately addressed and were viewed as secondary efforts to "real" missions. The SC MAGTF helps to formalize a plan to conduct security cooperation missions and provide the Marine Corps with a much needed capability that has been missing for some time.

Regionally-Focused Regiments will Support SC MAGTF Employment. The adaptation of regionally-focused regiments will enable the Marine Corps to assign Marines special skills or experience in units where they can provide the best benefit. As *Send in the Marines* states,

Among these changed practices is the implementation of a regional focus for units that source this new capability SC MAGTF. Through this initiative, changes to manpower policies will enable the development of linguistically adept, culturally aware units for training foreign military forces.-34

As the Marine Corps begins to designate specific units to source SC MAGTF for persistent capacity building activities, a unit will be able to build experience and mission-specific skills. This experience will assist Marine efforts in optimizing effectiveness and preserving continuity in missions. Most importantly, however, regional focus will enable the building and sustainment of the relationships with foreign military personnel. These relationships are critical to develop lasting capacity and cooperation

SC MAGTF: Forward Persistent Presence and Early Engagement. The SC MAGTF will bring smaller scale and persistent engagement to the dark corners of the globe. Currently, MEU engagement activities, while of great value, are episodic and limited. Normally, a MEU conducts a port call or short bilateral exercises with foreign forces and then departs, usually accomplishing little to build and sustain partner capacity. MEU activities sometimes amount to little more than “showing the flag” abroad. The SC MAGTF can augment MEU efforts and transform these routine peacetime engagement efforts toward a strategy aimed at building the capacity of allies and partners. This is a change to the mindset of former deployments. Historically, Marines deployed on a MEU viewed their primary role as deterrence and response to a crisis. However, the SC MAGTF will emphasize the importance of influencing events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable.

The SC MAGTF will also enable cooperation by helping partner countries train to a specific set of goals to lay the foundation for U.S. partners that work with the Marine Corps in the future. This increase in common skills and interoperability will enable not only security cooperation efforts in peacetime, but also possible coalitions for the future.

Adding the SC MAGTF to the deployment cycle also will put more Marines forward deployed and will result in more persistent presence abroad. Based on a force of 27 active-duty infantry battalions, the new "operational employment concept" puts nine infantry battalions forward at all times: three Marine Expeditionary Units on board ships, three forward-deployed battalions to Guam and Okinawa, and three SC MAGTFs deployed to Central Command, South Command, and the Newly formed Africa Command.

The SC MAGTF Takes Advantage of the Marine Corps' Naval Character. The SC MAGTF takes advantage of naval cooperation to move and sustain its forces in a distributed manner and to project security cooperation force. Although the main element of the SC MAGTF will probably deploy to an advance ground base, the elements of the SC MAGTF will disaggregate throughout the area of operations to conduct security cooperation. These elements can augment or receive support from Navy security cooperation efforts.

As a more detailed vision of the "soft power" elements in the Navy's new Maritime Strategy, which is described in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power* and was released in October 2007, the SC MAGTF shares a similar purpose with the Navy's Global Fleet Stations (GFS). The GFS concept uses a ship, or group of ships, deployed to a specific region with embarked local-language speakers and training cadres to conduct security cooperation efforts. The SC MAGTF will be linked to the Navy's Global Fleet Stations to facilitate operations with amphibious shipping, high speed vessels, and other naval support to provide

forward presence via sea basing. Joint efforts between the Navy and Marine Corps team through GFS and SCMAGTF coordination will produce an additive effect, providing a more efficient use of resources.

The SC MAGTF focuses on building partner capacity. The NSS outlines the importance of “assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and defeating adversaries” in order to win the Long War^{xxx}. Using the SC MAGTF, the Marine Corps will increase the United States’ capability to fulfill commitments abroad by strengthening the roles of allies and partners. The primary purpose of the SC MAGTF is to provide security assistance and conduct civil-military operations with cooperative but less-developed nations. With this purpose in mind, the SC MAGTF will bring unique capabilities and a unique task organization separate from a MEU.

Security cooperation is more than training security forces and providing civil services. Effective security cooperation builds capacity in a variety of areas. A principal aim in increasing a security cooperation posture is to help partners build the capacity to modernize their own strategies, doctrines, and forces so they can operate with U.S. forces. The SC MAGTF is a vehicle for pushing capabilities forward. It is the key to keeping U.S. alliances capable, relevant, and therefore sustainable for decades to come. The SC MAGTF is designed to enable the delivery of these capabilities.

SC MAGTFs are capable of augmenting special operating forces (SOF) in conducting security cooperation missions. Not long ago irregular warfare was considered the domain of SOF. But the focus of military strategy must change along with the character of war. *The 2006 Quarterly Defense Review* spells out how thinking in the Department of Defense is now subscribing to security cooperation methods formerly organic only to SOF. The demand

for forces coming from regional combatant commanders to conduct security cooperation activities currently exceeds the SOF available to support the missions. SC MAGTFs will be capable to assume general-purpose advisory roles that are now SOF tasks, thereby freeing SOF units for more complicated missions. While the SC MAGTFs assume these general-purpose military advisory roles, they will not be assuming special operations training missions. The additional forces freed up by the addition of Marine efforts will give SOF more operational flexibility to perform missions that require the specialties and skill sets that SOF possesses.

Security cooperation will create a high perpetually demanding of op tempo.

Effective Security cooperation will require an enormous commitment of resources and manpower. In the pre-2001 world, supporting the rotation of battalions to Okinawa, along with the continuous deployment of three Marine Expeditionary Units, was demanding. The Long War Concept now demands Marines to add global language, cultural knowledge and counter-insurgency skills to their expertise and the Marine Corps to reorganize for widely scattered security cooperation missions. Adding skills to the already long list of individual and unit requirements requires more training time, training funds, and training facilities. These three resources were already scarce commodities as Marines units scrambled to prepare for pre-9/11 deployments. In the best case scenario, the Marine Corps will achieve a 1:2 deployments to dwell time ratio. This is an increase in the operation tempo of most units before 9/11, but is sustainable in light of the consequence of the Long War. Marines will have to become more efficient at training to standards with less time and compete for scarce resources (e.g., ammunition ranges) if they are to maintain the traditional high state of predeployment readiness.

Security Cooperation will require a few changes in the way the Marine Corps conducts training and retention. Systemic improvements to Marine Corps operations are

needed to effectively conduct and sustain security cooperation efforts while maintaining the Marine Corps' dominance in conventional combat operations. Marines tend to be a young force, and effectively building the capacity of foreign militaries demands maturity, skill, and experience gained over several years. Adding the security cooperation/foreign internal defense capacity will require the Marine Corps to change its training processes, retention, and assignment of Marines. Specifically, the SC MAGTF will require seasoned leaders; therefore, the Marine Corps may need to adjust how it selects and retains SC MAGTF Marines. Military author Max Boot describes this need for an adjustment in the force when he writes that "[t]he Marine Corps is superb at turning 18-year-old mall rats into stone-cold killers[, but] it's more difficult to turn them into goodwill ambassadors and intelligence analysts—both essential missions for troops engaged in stability work. It might help if the Corps got older."^{xxxi} Careful consideration of each individual's ability to comprehend this vital role is paramount to the success of introducing the young Marines to this security cooperation.

Security cooperation, if not managed correctly can still amount to Eposodic training events. Building capacity of a foreign government takes time, effort, and tremendous resources. It is important to manage expectations resulting from the employment of the SC MAGTF. There are limits to what can be accomplished by a small amount of Marines without proper funding. Haphazard employment of forces too disaggregated can render security cooperation efforts ineffective. The Marine Corps should start small and focus on persistent engagement, rather than adopting an ambitious goal that could end up under-funded and under-manned.

XI. Conclusions

This paper asked three questions to determine whether the Marine Corps should adopt security cooperation as a mission. The first question asked: Is security cooperation a valid

concept in order to face today's irregular challenges? The answer is yes, security cooperation is a valid concept for countering the irregular threats the nation will face in the long war. While there will always be a need for the United States to defeat standing armies with conventional force, conventional military operations alone are not sufficient to defeat the irregular opponent. Security cooperation is directed toward shaping the environment and confronting the underlying conditions that contribute to global instability and radical ideology that fuels terrorism. Victory in the Long War can be possible only with the help of friends and allies.


The paper's second question was: Should the Marine Corps adopt security cooperation as a Mission? Again, the answer is yes. The U.S. Marine Corps has a rich history of successfully conducting security cooperation missions during its "Small War" period. The Marine Corps is a culturally flexible, small unit expeditionary force. Marine doctrine and concepts, such as distributed operations, sea basing, and MAGTF employment, seem to be a tailor made for the security cooperation mission. However, since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps has been employed primarily as a large ground based force relying on a largely static support network. Relevancy in the Long War requires the Marine Corps to resume its expeditionary efforts to counter the growing irregular threat. Security cooperation is a good example of such a mission.

Finally, the third question was: Is the Marine Corps' concept of the SC MAGTF an effective means to conduct security cooperation efforts? The answer is again, yes. The addition of the SC MAGTF provides the Marine Corps with a full spectrum force. The SC MAGTF has the focus task organization and capabilities to effectively build partner capacity. The SC MAGTF takes advantage of the MAGTF concept and will bring the same level of excellence to the Marine Corps' security cooperation efforts as a MEU brings to forcible entry.

Victory in the Long War will require effective security cooperation with partners and allies. Increased globalization has made the vital interests of the United States increasingly joined to interests of other nations. Through effective security cooperation, America and its Allies can prevent as well as defeat the growing irregular threats of the Long War. The Marine Corps' addition of the SC MAGTF is a suitable solution to contribute to the nation's security cooperation efforts.

XII. Appendix 1


Figure 1.



Slide 9-"The Long War Concept" The Marine Corps Vision for Strategic Force Employment ISO the Steady State Security Posture. PowerPoint Presentation (Washington DC: Plans, Policy, and Operations, 7 Jan. 2008)

XIII. Appendix 2


Figure 2.



Slide 10-"The Long War Concept" The Marine Corps Vision for Strategic Force Employment ISO the Steady State Security Posture. PowerPoint Presentation (Washington DC:Plans, Policy, and Operations, 7 Jan. 2008)

XIV. Appendix 3

Figure 3



Page 8- Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept to meet an Uncertain Security Environment. (Washington DC: Plans, Policy, and Operations, 2007)

XV. Bibliography

"The Long War Concept" The Marine Corps Vision for Strategic Force Employment ISO the Steady State Security Posture. PowerPoint Presentation (Washington DC:Plans, Policy, and Operations, 7 Jan. 2008)

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<<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/miltraining.cfm>>.

Grey, Colin S. *"Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?"* Strategic Studies Institute 1 (2006): 1.

XVI. Notes

ⁱ The National Security Strategy can be located and viewed at:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionIII.html>

The National Defense Strategy can be located and viewed at:

<http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nds/nds.pdf>

ⁱⁱ Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment avail at:

<http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446044&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

Send in the Marines A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept To Meet An Uncertain Security Environment. Avail at <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/thelongwarsendinthemarines.pdf>
Henceforth the concepts outlined in these two publications are referred to as The Long War Concept.

ⁱⁱⁱ Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today's strategic environment. We can identify trends but cannot predict specific events with precision. While we work to avoid being surprised, we must posture to handle unanticipated problems-we must plan with surprise in mind. Donald H Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington , Dc: Department of Defense, March 1, 2005) p.2

^{iv} "Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare factors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will" (Irregular Warfare Roadmap-QDR)

^v "...One of the main sources of reaction and opposition is radical Islam -- the perversion by a few of a noble faith into an ideology of terror and death. Terrorists like bin Laden are serious about mass murder -- and all of us must take their declared intentions seriously." Available from

[Http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html) : Internet accessed March 2008

^{vi} Terrorist trade in narcotics as a source of funding. Criminal organizations provide money laundering services, guns, military equipment, and other contraband to terrorists. In some regions of the world, notably South Asia and Latin America, insurgency, terrorism, and drug trade are locked together in what has been called a "symbiotic relationship". Security Cooperation and Nonstate Threats-Colonel Albert Zaccor – Pages 3-4

^{vii} National Security Strategy, page 5

^{viii} Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, Remarks to Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars September 25, 2006. Available online at: http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20060925_speech.pdf

^{ix} Beyer,

^x This approach to defeating irregular war is outlined in several recent publications including "Countering Irregular Threats :A comprehensive Approach" June 2006 and the Long War Concept Jan 2008

^{xi} Ibid 17

^{xii} JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 04 March 2008 internet accessed march 2008 at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>

^{xiii} These states are primarily Eurasian, Middle Eastern, and Aisian state located along the "Arc of Instability" which stretches west to east from southwestern Europe through the Caucasus, Central and South Asia, down into Southwestern Asia, as well Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America.

^{xiv} "In all these areas -- from the disruption of terror networks to victory in Iraq to the spread of freedom and hope in troubled regions -- we need to support our friends and allies", President George W. Bush stay the Union speech, available online at <http://www.whitehouse./stateoftheUnion/2006/index.html>. Accessed March 2008.

^{xv} ... the United States will lead and calls on other nations to join us in the commoner national effort. All free nations have a responsibility to stand together for freedom, because all free nations share an interest in freedom's advance 2006 national security strategy. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/section II.html> : internet-access on March 2008

^{xvi} "... the United States will lead and calls on other nations to join us in a common international effort, all free nations have a responsibility to stand together for freedom, because all free nations share an interest in freedom's advance 2006 National Security Strategy.

^{xvii} National Defense Strategy March 2005 accessed online at:

<http://www.cngr.gov/pdf/library/Copy%20of%204%20national%20defense%20strategy%202005.pdf>

^{xviii} 2002 national security strategy.

^{xix} "On September the 11th, 2001. We found the problems originating in failed and oppressive state 7000 miles away could bring murder and destruction to our own country. Dictatorships shelter terrorists, and feed presentment

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and radicalism, and seek weapons of mass instruction." State of the Union address 2006. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html> : accessed March 2008

^{xx} the White House, national security strategy of the United States of America(Washington, DC: Government printing office March 2006), 20 label from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> ; Internet access on March 2008

^{xxi} Joseph D Celeski, "Attacking Insurgents Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction," *Military Review* (November-December 2006): 51-57

^{xxii} "U.S.-Malaysia Defense Cooperation: A Solid Success Story" The Honorable Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak avail online at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/HL742.cfm>; accessed March 2008

^{xxiii} "Georgia is an example of a "weak state," which Ghia Nodia says is a country "that meets the minimalist functions of a state through all or in most of its territory but is seriously challenged in its capacity to implement some major state functions and policies that have been reasonably well defined by political actors and are expected from its own population."(9) Georgia does not control two significant portions of its territory -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- and only barely controls Adjara. The regime also is unable to meet many responsibilities assigned to it by Georgia's current Constitution-such as collection of tax revenue, protection of natural political rights and prosecution of criminals. These difficulties notwithstanding, the Georgian state today is stronger than it was seven years ago." *Helping Georgia?* By Irakly G. Areshidze(1) Perspective Volume XII, Number 4 (March - April 2002) avail at <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/areshidze.html> Accessed march 2008

^{xxiv} Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach p13

^{xxv} "Send in the Marines" USMC Long war pamphlet page 16

^{xxvi} countering irregular threats: a comprehensive approach

^{xxvii} "many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or US civilian professionals.

Nonetheless, US military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate timely withdrawal of US and foreign forces." Department of Defense Directive no 3000. 05 November 28, 2005.

Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/d3000_05.pdf; Internet accessed March 2008

^{xxviii} "The tradition of excellence in combined arms, expeditionary, and high spec in combat operations will remain fundamental to the units that comprise the SC MAGTF. Training events such as combined arms exercises (CAX), mountain warfare training, and amphibious exercises will remain basic to these units training regime. However, specialized training in culture and language will also be provided." "Send in the Marines" USMC Long war pamphlet -page 16

^{xxix} "if efforts to shape the environment and deter threats fail, our full spectrum capable Marines will be well-positioned to transition to high spectrum combat operations to defeat our nation's adversaries"

^{xxx} 2002 national security strategy.

^{xxxi} Max boot http://www.cfr.org/publication/10204/beyond_the_3block_war.html